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We analyze the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policies in a monetary union
where the common central bank is more conservative than the ﬁscal authorities. When
monetary and ﬁscal policies are discretionary, we ﬁnd that the Nash equilibrium is
sub-optimal with higher output and lower inﬂation than the cooperative Ramsey op-
timum. In a further example of counterproductive cooperative, we ﬁnd that ﬁscal
cooperation makes matters worse. We also examine cooperative and non-cooperative
ﬁscal policy in the case where the central bank can commit and has the same prefer-
ences as the ﬁscal authorities.
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The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe has a common central bank that
decides monetary policy, but each member country's government decides its own ¯scal pol-
icy. The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be
independent of day-to-day political control from the member countries. This raises some
new issues for the conduct of monetary and ¯scal policies in the EMU. First, the monetary
policy of the ECB and the ¯scal policies of the member countries are decided separately (as
a non-cooperative game); this leads to a Nash or leadership equilibrium depending on the
structure of the game. Second, the ECB is likely to be more conservative than the politicians
who run the treasuries in the member countries, either by explicit mandate or by natural
inclination. This conservatism may concern both the ideal levels of outputs and in°ation and
the tradeo®s among them. This con°ict of objectives raises the possibility that the resulting
equilibrium is suboptimal.
In this paper we examine the interaction of monetary and ¯scal policies in a monetary
union and ¯nd some new results and suggestions regarding the design of the policy institu-
tions. We consider a model where monetary and ¯scal policies a®ect output and in°ation,
and the policymakers have possibly con°icting objectives regarding outputs, in°ation and the
tradeo®s among them. Because some prices are set in advance, an unanticipated monetary
expansion raises output and in°ation. An unanticipated ¯scal expansion of demand ¯nanced
by lump-sum taxes puts an upward pressure on prices and expands supply. When monetary
policy is discretionary, the con°ict of objectives leads to a non-cooperative race between the
monetary and the ¯scal authorities. With ¯scal policies trying to achieve output beyond
the central bank's ideal, and the monetary policy trying to achieve in°ation below the ¯scal
authorities' ideal, in the resulting Nash equilibrium both in°ation and output can be more
extreme than the ideal points of all policymakers. Most importantly, the Nash equilibrium
is suboptimal.
The suboptimality of the Nash equilibrium arises irrespective of whether the ¯scal au-
thorities cooperate or not in choosing their policies. In fact, the Nash equilibrium without
cooperation may be less extreme and welfare-superior to the Nash equilibrium with cooper-
ation. This occurs because cooperation exacerbates the time-consistency problem of ¯scal
policies.
These results suggest that, when there is a con°ict of objectives among the monetary
and ¯scal authorities, cooperation may fail to improve economic outcomes. Careful design of
monetary and ¯scal institutions so as to make the central bank and the governments agree
on the ideal levels of output and in°ation leads to better outcomes. In that case, the desired
goals are achieved despite any disagreement about the relative importance of the two goals,
despite lack of cooperation among the policy-makers and without the need for monetary
commitment.
22 Literature Review
Several works have considered the interaction of monetary and ¯scal policies in a monetary
union. Sibert (1992), Levine and Brociner (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) con-
sider monetary-¯scal interaction in a monetary union where the purpose of ¯scal policy is the
provision of public goods. This literature suggests that a monetary union with decentralized
¯scal decisions and discretionary monetary policy produces an in°ationary bias and exces-
sive spending on public goods; ¯scal coordination or ¯scal leadership may discipline ¯scal
and monetary policy. In this paper, we focus on the countercyclical role of ¯scal policy. We
consider a central bank and a government with possibly con°icting goals over output and
in°ation, and study the equilibria with and without monetary commitment, including Nash
and leadership equilibria.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003 a) study in detail the case where the monetary and ¯scal
authorities agree about the ideal levels of output and in°ation; Dixit and Lambertini (2001)
study the case where monetary and ¯scal authorities disagree on their ideal outcomes. In
these papers, however, ¯scal policies do not have a time-consistency problem.
Cooper and Kempf (2000) analyze monetary and ¯scal policy with and without a mone-
tary union in a two-country setting where the monetary and ¯scal authorities agree on the
policy goals. Unlike the setting of our model, the two authorities share a budget constraint in
Cooper and Kempf. Each person gets an idiosyncratic shock that determines their preference
between home and foreign goods; moreover, there is a cash-in-advance requirement in the
currency of the good to be purchased and the exchange rate market cannot be accessed after
the idiosyncratic shock is realized. The bene¯ts of joining the union are that individuals
can hold the optimal quantity of money; the costs are that each ¯scal authority is tempted
to raise its own GDP via expansionary monetary policy, passing on some of the costs to
the other country in the form of higher common prices. When the monetary authority has
leadership, a monetary union is Pareto-improving; however, if the ¯scal authorities have
leadership or monetary transfers to the ¯scal authorities are constrained, a monetary union
is welfare improving only if the aggregate shocks are highly correlated.
3 The Model
We consider a world economy that consists of two countries, country 1 and country 2. These
two countries are in a monetary union and therefore share a common currency. They have
separate governments that run ¯scal policies; monetary policy, on the other hand, is decided
by a common and independent central bank. We now proceed to model country 1; country
2 is symmetric.
33.1 Consumers



























with d > 0;Â > 0;´ ¸ 0 and ½ > 1: 0 < ¯ < 1 is a discount factor, C1;t is consumption,
M1;t=Pt are real balances. N1;t(i) is the quantity of labor of type i supplied by the repre-
sentative individual to domestic ¯rms; it is assumed that each di®erentiated good uses a
specialized labor input in its production. The assumption of di®erentiated labor inputs is
not necessary but convenient, as households with identical initial assets supply the same
quantities of labor and receive the same labor income. ´ > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal
disutility of labor with respect to labor supply. G1;t is public spending. Hence, it is assumed
here that period utility depends positively on public good provision by the own-country gov-
ernment, with the parameter ® measuring the relative importance of public versus private
consumption for welfare. Because we are interested in studying how monetary and ¯scal
polices can better stabilize output and in°ation in response to shocks, our welfare analysis
will be based on the limiting economy as ® goes to zero and public spending ceases to raise
social welfare per se.1
There is a continuum of di®erentiated goods distributed over the interval [0;1]; a fraction
n of these goods is produced in country 1 while the fraction 1 ¡ n is produced in country 2.










where C1;t(i) is consumption of good i at time t and µ > 1 is the constant elasticity of
substitution among the individual goods. The representative household consumes all goods














which is the minimum cost of a unit of the aggregate consumption good de¯ned by (3), given
the individual goods prices P1;t(i);P2;t(i).
1We do not need to assume that ® ! 0. In fact, our results hold true if ® > 0 as long as ® < 1=(µ ¡ 1).
Intuitively, if ® < 1=(µ ¡ 1) government spending is a public good that raises social welfare but, in a sense,
not enough; the natural rate of output is still suboptimally low so that monetary and ¯scal policies are time
inconsistent. See Appendix B for a detailed proof.
4The representative household in country 2 has symmetric preferences to those in (2)
and (3). We allow for exogenous aggregate disturbances to the period utility function as the
parameters d;µ;´ are stochastic. Because of our assumption that these preference parameters
are common to the two countries, these are monetary-union-wide shocks.
All households in country 1 begin with the same amount of ¯nancial assets. Hence,
they will have the same intertemporal budget constraints and will therefore choose the same
sequences of consumption, real balances and e®orts. The budget constraint for the represen-



















di + T1;t ¡ ¿1;t: (5)
Here B1;t+1 is the purchase of a riskless bond that pays one unit of aggregate consumption
at time t+1. This bond is the only asset available for borrowing or lending between the two
countries and rt is the net real interest rate. W1;t(i) is the nominal wage of labor of type i in
period t and ¦1;t(i) are nominal pro¯ts of the country 1 ¯rm producing good i. We assume
that each household in country 1 owns an equal share of all the ¯rms in the country, but
no shares in the ¯rms in country 2. T1;t represents transfers received from the household in
country 1 at time t and ¿1;t is a lump-sum tax levied by the government of country 1 at time
t on the citizens of that country.
Households face four decisions. First, how to allocate consumption across the di®erenti-
ated goods. Taking prices as given, the optimal consumption of good i produced in country







where j = 1 if good i is produced in country 1 and j = 2 otherwise. Second, the house-
hold must decide the optimal amount of riskless bonds to purchase, B1;t+1. The ¯rst-order
condition delivers the Euler equation
1
C1;t




Third, the household must decide the optimal level of money balances to carry into next










where it+1 is the nominal interest rate de¯ned as




Finally, the household must decide the optimal quantity of each type of labor to supply,









There is a common central bank that runs monetary policy for the monetary union; in
addition, there are two governments that run ¯scal policies, one in each country. The central
bank is instrument-independent in the sense that it chooses monetary policy freely and it
does not share the government budget constraints. We also assume that the central bank is
conservative in the sense that it maximizes a utility that is more conservative than society's
{ this will be explained in detail in section 4. Let total money supply in the monetary union
be Mt ´ M1;t + M2;t. The budget constraint for the central bank is




Hence, the central bank rebates seignorage back to households in the two countries.
In each country, ¯scal policy consists of public spending ¯nanced with lump-sum taxes.
We realistically assume that each government spends only on the goods produced domesti-
cally. The budget constraint for the government in country 1 is
¿1;t = G1;t; (12)






G1;t; 8i 2 [0;n]; (13)







G1;t; 8i 2 (n;1]; (14)
and zero otherwise. The governments are benevolent and choose public spending so as to
maximize the utility function of the representative individual. Optimal public spending in
country 1 is given by
G1;t = (®C1;t)
½; (15)
and similarly for country 2. Optimal public spending becomes negligible as ® goes to zero.
3.3 Firms
The production function for the goods produced in country 1 makes only use of labor and
is given by
Y1;t(i) = A1;tN1;t(i); (16)
where A1;t is an exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all ¯rms in country 1,
i.e. a supply-side aggregate shock. In country 2, the production function is
Y2;t(i) = A2;tN2;t(i); (17)
6where A2;t is an exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all ¯rms in country
2. We will consider alternative assumptions about the correlation between the technological
shocks in the two countries.
Nomimal pro¯ts at time t for ¯rm i in country 1 are given by
¦1;t(i) = Pt(i)Y1;t(i) ¡ W1;t(i)N1;t(i): (18)
The ¯rst term on the right hand side of (18) represents revenues from selling the good; the
second term on the right hand side is the cost of producing, which is the nominal wage bill
for employed labor. In (18) we have assumed that the ¯rm takes the nominal wage as given.





















t + G1;t) (21)
where Cw
t ´ nC1;t + (1 ¡ n)C2;t is world private consumption. If prices are °exible, ¯rms
choose prices every period to maximize the present value of current and future pro¯ts;
because they can choose prices every period, this implies that ¯rms choose prices so as to







With °exible prices, it is optimal for the ¯rm to set its price as a markup over the marginal
cost. The markup µ=(µ ¡ 1) falls as µ grows: the markup falls as the monopolistic power
of the ¯rm becomes smaller, i.e. as goods become better substitutes. Notice that the
nominal marginal cost is country-speci¯c because technological shocks are country-speci¯c
and because di®erent ¯scal policies result in di®erent nominal wages.
3.4 Equilibrium







7Bonds are in zero net supply and clearing on the bond market implies that
nB1;t + (1 ¡ n)B2;t = 0; 8t: (24)









t = nY1;t + (1 ¡ n)Y2;t:
Total private consumption in the world economy is equal to world production minus world
government spending.
3.5 Steady State
At the randomless steady state, all di®erentiated goods have identical prices and wages across







where variables without a time subscript indicate steady-state values. Labor is also equalized















Y1 ¡ G1 + rB1 (29)
where r = (1 ¡ ¯)=¯ and B1 is steady-state bond holding by country 1. We focus on an







where government spending is given by
G1 = (®C1)
½: (31)
8An increase in government spending raises output in the steady state. Because higher gov-
ernment spending requires higher taxes, households reduce consumption and substitute out
of leisure into work, thereby raising production. Hence, government spending does not crowd








Steady state output is suboptimally low due to the monopolistic power of producers. As the










The e±cient level of output can also be achieved by an appropriate production subsidy that
o®sets the distortion due to market power;2 here we abstract from such subsidy. The steady
state for country 2 is completely symmetric but a function of A2;G2.
3.6 The Dynamics of Prices
We assume that, in every period, a fraction Á 2 [0;1] of ¯rms in each country cannot change
their prices while the remaining fraction 1 ¡Á of ¯rms can adjust their prices; the following
period, all ¯rms are free to choose their prices. In other words, suppose an unanticipated
shock occurs at time t; a fraction Á of ¯rms cannot change their prices at t and they will
adjust production to meet demand; these ¯rms, however, can freely choose their desired
prices in period t + 1. A fraction 1 ¡ Á of ¯rms can freely choose their prices at time t and
at time t + 1 (as well as in any other period).
This adjustment mechanism is relatively simple because it guarantees full adjustment in
one period; in fact, we are able to solve analytically the model (which we would not be able






















t = n ~ P
1¡µ
1;t + (1 ¡ n) ~ P
1¡µ
2;t :
In each country, all suppliers that set new prices at t face exactly the same decision problem;
hence, the newly set price ~ Pj;t is the same for all of them and is therefore not a function of
i but it is a function of j, the country to which suppliers belong.
A supplier in country 1 that sets a new price at t chooses it so as to maximize current
pro¯ts; the price chosen by such ¯rm is as in (22). Let a small letter indicate the percentage
deviation from the steady state value of the corresponding capitalized variable, for example
at ´ dAt=A. We have that
~ p1;t ¡ pt = w1;t ¡ a1;t; (35)
2The appropriate production subsidy is 1=(µ ¡ 1).
9and a similar expression holds for country 2. Log-linearizing (34) and using (35) and its









t ´ nw1;t + (1 ¡ n)w2;t;aw
t ´ na1;t + (1 ¡ n)a2;t and ¼t ´ pt ¡ pt¡1.
Appendix A log-linearizes the model around the steady state; aggregate in°ation can be
written as a function of monetary and ¯scal policies and current shocks:
¼t = mt +
2 X
i=1
cigi;t + !t + °¯Et¼t+1; (37)
where ¼t ´ pt ¡ pt¡1. All parameters are described in appendix A. Aggregate in°ation is
a sum of the component mt, which is the controlled part of monetary policy and it is an
increasing function of money supply, and a further contribution arising from ¯scal policies
gi;t. ci > 0: an increase in government spending ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes raises in°ation.
The term !t captures the e®ect of lagged prices, technological and government spending
shocks.
Output in country 1 is given by
y1;t = ¹ y1;t +
2 X
i=1
a1;igi;t + bi(¼t ¡ ¯¼
e
t+1): (38)
A similar equation holds for country 2. The explanation of the parameters in the output
equation (38) is as follows: [1] y1;t is percentage deviation of the natural rate of output
in country 1 at t from its steady-state value. The natural rate of output is the level of
production that arises in the country with steady-state monetary and ¯scal policies; this
is suboptimally low. [2] The scalars a1;i is the direct e®ect of ¯scal policy of country i on
the GDP of country 1. When governments spend only on the goods produced at home, a
¯scal expansion raises home GDP but its e®ect on the other country's GDP is uncertain:
ai;i > 0;ai;j
¸
< 0 for i 6= j. [3] ¼e
t+1 is ¯rms' rational expectation of ¼t+1 as of time t. [4] The
last term on the right-hand side of equation (38) is the usual supply e®ect of an unexpected
increase in in°ation; thus bi > 0. All these parameters and the derivation of (38) are spelled
out in detail in Appendix A.
4 Preferences of Policymakers
The central bank chooses a policy variable mt, which stands for the base money supply,
and determines a component of the price level; thus higher mt means a more expansionary
monetary policy. The ¯scal authority in each country in the monetary union chooses a
policy variable gi;t; a larger gi;t means higher government spending and therefore a more
expansionary ¯scal policy. These policies a®ect the GDP levels and aggregate in°ation
according to equations (38) and (37) above.
10The ¯scal authorities are assumed to be benevolent. In the non-cooperative scenario,
each ¯scal authority choose ¯scal policy to maximize social welfare of the country's citi-
zens, namely the utility of the representative individual in the country. We approximate
this utility by a second-order Taylor series expansion to the level of expected utility of the
representative consumer in the country in the rational expectations equilibrium associated
with given monetary and ¯scal policies { see appendix B. We are interested in the welfare
e®ects of output and in°ation stabilization; for this reason, we consider the second-order
approximation to the utility of the representative household as ® ! 0 and the direct welfare
e®ect of public goods becomes very small.





s¡tUF;i;s; i = 1;2; (39)
where the period utility Ui;t is approximated by
Ui;t = ¡LF;i;t;






2 + µF;i(yi;t ¡ yF;i)
2 + 2±igi;t
i
; i = 1;2: (40)
¼F;i = 0 and it is socially optimal to minimize price level dispersion. The GDP that minimizes
social losses in country i is yF;i, which is the GDP that would arise in an economy with °exible
prices and without monopolistic power by the ¯rms; hence, yF;i ¸ yi;t and extra output is
desirable. Fiscal policy can raise output above its natural rate, but it creates social losses
±i > 0 because government spending is ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes that reduce private
consumption. µF;i > 0 parameterizes the social preference for the output versus the in°ation
goals. All parameters are spelled out in Appendix B.
If the ¯scal authorities cooperate, they choose ¯scal policies so as to maximize social









LF;t = °LF;1;t + (1 ¡ °)LF;2;t
and the parameter ° is the weight of country 2 in social welfare. For simplicity, we are
going to assume that ° = 0:5 and both countries have equal weight in the cooperative social
welfare function.
Monetary policy is chosen by a monetary authority that is conservative in a way that

















where yM;i is the central bank's output target for country i, µM;i the preference for the output-
in-country-i versus the prive-level goals for the monetary authority and ¼M the in°ation
target. The central bank is more conservative than society in the sense that µM;i · µF;i;yM;i ·
yF;i for all i and/or ¼M · 0.
The natural rate of output yi;t, the scalar parameters ai;j summarizing the ¯scal policy
e®ects on GDPs, the scalar parameters bi for the supply e®ect of surprise in°ation, the scalar
parameters ci of the e®ect of ¯scal policy on in°ation level, the scalar parameter ±i for the
deadweight losses of ¯scal policies, the scalar parameters µF;i for the social preferences, the
e±cient levels of output yF;i, the central bank's output targets yM;i and in°ation targets ¼M;i
and the scalar parameters µM;i for the central bank's preferences, are all stochastic shocks
because they depend on the ¯ve stochastic preference and technology parameters of our
structural model (d;µ;´;A1;A2). We denote the whole vector of these shocks by zt. The
policy variables mt and g1;t;g2;t are implemented after the shocks are observed, and therefore
are written as functions m(zt) and g1(zt);g2(zt) (although the functional form may be ¯xed
before the shocks are observed in regimes where policies are precommitted). The resulting
outcomes of GDPs and in°ation are then also realization-speci¯c or functions y1(zt);y2(zt)
and ¼(zt).
The condition of rational expectations is
¼
e
t = Ezt[¼(zt)] ´
Z
¼(zt); (44)
where the integral is taken over the distribution of z, and is ¯ve-dimensional since all the
components of z are functions of ¯ve underlying structural parameters d;´;µ;A1;A2. In
words, ¼e
t is the ¯rms' rational expectation of ¼t as of time t ¡ s;s < t.
4.1 Timing of events
In absence of commitment, we consider the case where monetary and ¯scal policies are
chosen simultaneously (Nash); at the same time, ¯scal policies may be cooperative or not.
If monetary policy is precommitted, then it has leadership with respect to setting the rule,
and ¯scal policies are followers in each state of the world (realization of the shocks); if
¯scal policies are precommitted, they have leadership with respect to setting the rule, and
monetary policy is the follower in each state of the world. Once again, ¯scal policies can be
choosen cooperatively or not whether they can be precommitted or discretionary.
Hence, the timing of events is as follows:
1. We consider two possible scenarios:
(a) If there is commitment, the three policies are chosen in a coordinated manner
maxizing social welfare in the union.
12(b) If the policy regime is one of discretion, nothing happens at this step.
2. The private sector forms expectations ¼e
t. When ¯rms set their prices at time s < t,
they rationally forecast future in°ation.
3. The stochastic shock vector zt is realized.
4. If the policy regime is one of discretion, the central bank chooses mt and the ¯scal
authorities choose ¯scal policies, cooperatively or not. All these policies are chosen
simultaneously. If the policy regime is one of commitment, the central bank simply
implements the monetary rule mt that was chosen at step 1 and the ¯scal authorities
simply implement the ¯scal rules chosen at step 1.
5 Joint Commitment
First we study the equilibrium with joint commitment of monetary and ¯scal policies. This
is done when all authorities can precommit so as to maximize social welfare in the union.
This delivers the socially optimal and feasible allocation that we refer to as second best;
hence, it is the natural benchmark against which to compare all other equilibria.
Let both the monetary and ¯scal authorities minimize the social loss function (41) and
recognize the rational expectations constraint. Since this is a separable problem, at step 1




t into the objective complicates the algebra, because it then involves one in-
tegration inside another. We avoid this by regarding the authorities as if they had another
choice variable, namely ¼e
t, but their choice was subject to the constraint (44). After sub-












where ¸t is the Lagrangean multiplier. The ¯rst-order condition with respect to the function
g1(zt);g2(zt) and mt are given by
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Figure 1: Full Commitment










1 ¡ ¯ + Ã








(yF;i ¡ yi;t); ¼
e
t = 0; ¼(zt) = ¡2¸t +
2 X
i=1
biµF;i(yF;i ¡ yi;t) (50)
y1(zt) = ~ y1;t = yF;1 ¡
±1a2;2 ¡ ±2a1;2
kAkµF;1




kAk ´ a1;1a2;2 ¡ a1;2a2;1
If ±1 = ±2 = 0:
y1;t = yF;1 y2;t = yF;2; ¼t = 0
The fully optimal, nonlinear rules for monetary and ¯scal policies deliver zero in°ation on
average. The equilibrium with joint commitment is shown in Figure 1.
The lagrangean multiplier of the rational expectations constraint is positive if output is
below its e±cient level and negative otherwise. The output gap in country i is higher the
larger the welfare cost of public spending ±i, the less important is output in social preferences
µF;i, and the smaller the direct impact of ¯scal policy on own output ai;i; however, the output
gap is smaller increases as the e®ect of the other's country ¯scal policy on own GDP rises.
The rational expectations constraint is binding when all the m;g are chosen ex-ante op-
timally. More precisely, ¸t is the average in°ation reduction achieved by joint commitment.3
3In fact, ¸t measures the in°ation bias that arises with discretionary monetary and ¯scal policies. This
result is shown in section 6.
146 Discretionary Policies: Nash equilibrium
6.1 Fiscal Non-cooperation
Now we consider the case where the ¯scal authorities do not cooperate when they choose
¯scal policies. After the realization of the stochastic shock vector zt, the ¯scal authority of
country 1 chooses g1;t so as to minimize LF;1;t, taking g2;t;mt as given; similarly, the ¯scal
authority of country 2 chooses g2;t so as to minimize LF;2;t, taking g1;t;mt as given; the
central bank chooses mt so as to minimize LM;t taking g1;t;g2;t as given. The authorities act
simultaneously; when they choose their policies, private sector's expectations ¼e
t are ¯xed.
The ¯rst-order condition for ¯scal policy in country 1 can be found by di®erentiating










The government of country 1 does not take into account the e®ect of its own policy on the










Equation (51) de¯nes the reaction function for the government of country 1 in the (y1;t;¼t)
space and equation(52) de¯nes the reaction function for the government of country 2 in the
(y2;t;¼t) space.
The ¯rst-order condition for monetary policy is obtained by di®erentiating (43) with
respect to mt, which gives
¼t = ¼M ¡
2 X
i=1
µM;ibi (yi;t ¡ yM;i): (53)
This de¯nes the reaction function for the monetary authority (MRF) in the (y1;t;y2;t;¼t)
space.
Under non-cooperation the ¯scal authority only considers the e®ects of its own ¯scal
policy on its own welfare. Hence, the ¯scal reaction function of country 1 depends only
on country 1's output and on in°ation; similarly, the ¯scal reaction function of country 2
depends only on country 2's output and in°ation. The monetary reaction function, on the
other hand, generally depends on both countries' GDP and on in°ation.
Figure 2 plots the reaction function of country 1 (FRF1) and the MRF in the y1;t;¼ space;
in drawing the MRF, we take y2;t¡yF;2 as given. The MRF is the solid line through point M,
the bliss point for the conservative monetary authority; because b1 > 0, MRF is negatively
sloped. If y2 increases, the MRF shifts vertically downward thereby lowering in°ation and
raising output in country 1, ceteris paribus.
FRF1 is the solid line below point F1, the bliss point for the ¯scal authority in country
















Figure 2: Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium
public spending so as to raise output to yF;i. The second best allocation is point C, where
y1;t = ~ y1 < yF;1 and ¼t = 0. It is easy to check that FRF1 is steeper than MRF. Graphically,
the Nash equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the two reaction functions MRF and FRF1,
and it is labeled N.4
The Nash equilibrium with non-cooperation has the following characteristics: output is
higher and in°ation is lower than socially optimal. These were also features of the Nash
equilibrium with cooperation. As with cooperation, the Nash equilibrium may be extreme.
In fact, ¯gure 2 depicts a Nash equilibrium where in°ation is in between the preferences of
monetary and ¯scal authorities. But the equilibrium may also occur on the right of point
M, thereby delivering output and in°ation that are beyond what both the central bank and
the ¯scal authority desire. This is shown in Figure 3.
If the Nash equilibrium without cooperation is such that y2;t < yF;2, the FRF1 moves
outward with respect to the position it would have with cooperation; in this case, the Nash
equilibrium with non-cooperation has lower in°ation and higher output than the Nash equi-
librium with cooperation. On the other hand, if y2;t > yF;2, the Nash equilibrium without
cooperation has lower output and higher in°ation than the one with cooperation. This im-
plies that the Nash equilibria with and without cooperation cannot be ranked from a social
welfare point of view, as non-cooperation may result in less extreme economic outcomes.
Intuitively, time inconsistency makes ¯scal policies too expansionary, thereby raising output
above optimality; the common, conservative central bank runs a contractionary monetary
policy that brings in°ation below optimality. Fiscal cooperation worsens time inconsistency
as each ¯scal authority is now tempted to expand its ¯scal policy even further.
4In drawing Figures 2 we have assumed that the central bank is appropriately conservative and µM;i =
µF;i;yM;i = yF;i and ¼M = ¡¸; our results, however, do not depend on these assumptions.
16Figure 3: Extreme Nash Equilibrium with Fiscal Non-cooperation
The intuition behind our result is a reminiscent of the second-best theory: when economic
outcomes are not ¯rst best, adding another distortion, i.e. non-cooperation, may actually
improve social welfare. Kehoe (1989) and Rogo® (1985b) have similar results.
6.2 Fiscal Cooperation
In this policy regime, after each realization of the stochastic shock vector zt, the ¯scal au-
thorities choose gi;t, taking mt as given, so as to minimize the union-wide loss function LF;t;
the monetary authority chooses mt, taking gi;t as given, so as to minimize its loss function
LM;t. The ¯scal authorites act cooperatively while the monetary and ¯scal authorities au-
thorities act non-cooperatively and simultaneously; however, when their choices are made,
the private sector's expectations ¼e
t are ¯xed. After completing the analysis of the policy
equilibrium and economic outcome for an arbitrarily given state zt, we can ¯nd ¼e
t from the
rational expectations condition (44).
The ¯rst-order conditions for ¯scal policies are obtained by di®erentiating (41) with



































These de¯ne the reaction functions of the ¯scal authorities (FRFs) in the (y1;t;y2;t;¼t)
space. One can obtain the reaction functions in terms of the policy variables (mt;g1;t;g2;t)










Table 1: Parameter Values
Because the ¯scal authorities cooperate, they recognize the impact of their own policies
on common in°ation, on own output and on the other country's output; at the same time,
each ¯scal authority internalizes the welfare cost of a ¯scal expansion (±i=ci).
The ¯rst-order condition for monetary policy is obtained by di®erentiating (43) with
respect to mt, which gives (53).
The Nash equilibrium outcomes yC
1;t;yC
2;t and ¼C
t are found by solving (54), (55), (53) and
(44) together and the solution is given in Appendix ??. Making use of (38) and (37) and
(44), we can ¯nd the policy variables mt and g1;t;g2;t that emerge in the Nash equilibrium.
This is also done in Appendix ??.
Because a2;1=c1 + b2 < 0, government spending in country 1 raises if y2;t > yF;2 with
respect to the case without cooperation; moreover, the social cost of public spending is now
half what it was in the case without cooperation, which shifts the FRF toward the right.
Whether the Nash equilibrium with ¯scal cooperation is more extreme than that without
cooperation depends on these e®ects.
6.3 Simulation and Welfare Comparison
This section compares social welfare under the discretionary regimes of Nash with and with-
out ¯scal cooperation from an ex ante point of view. We wish to shed some light on whether
¯scal cooperation is ex-ante preferable to ¯scal non-cooperation independently of the real-
ization of the shocks.
We run a Monte Carlo simulation using the parameter values derived within the structural
model. Changes in the parameters of the structural model necessarily imply changes in the
elements of zt, which are jointly distributed. For the steady state, we calibrate our model
using the parameter values typically used in the literature; these are summarized below;
also, see Gali (2001). We then assume preference shocks that deliver output °uctuations
within the range of +/- 6% of steady-state output, which are roughly consistent with the
°uctuations of U.S. output around a quadratic trend.
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the average di®erence in the social loss function between joint commitment








1 -408.0622 -4.28 100
Ln
1 ¡ Lc
1 -408.0666 -4.26 100
Table 2: Welfare Comparison
and Nash without cooperation, joint commitment and Nash with cooperation and Nash
without and with cooperation. Joint commitment is always best; then Nash without ¯scal
coordination follows. Nash with ¯scal coordination is a distant third in all cases (we run
1000 draws). In fact, the Nash equilibrium with ¯scal coordination is always extreme while
the Nash equilibrium without cooperation is not.
6.4 Interpretation
Our simulations showed that the Nash equilibrium with cooperation has the following charac-




t < 0. Hence, in the Nash cooperative equilibrium, in°a-
tion is lower than optimal.
A Nash equilibrium with high output and low in°ation may sound good; however, the
Nash equilibrium is suboptimal. In fact, household work too much in this equilibrium and
they would happily substitute labor for leisure; at the same time, lower-than-optimal in°ation
implies price dispersion that distorts consumption choices.
Why does the Nash equilibrium fail to achieve the second best? It is the time-inconsistency
of policies and the con°ict of objectives between the policymakers. With some prices pre-
set, ¯scal policies are more expansionary than under joint commitment because the ¯scal
authorities believe this will boost demand and therefore output. In a rational expectations'
equilibrium, the governments' incentive to raise spending are perfectly anticipated by ratio-
nal ¯rms and they result in higher output and higher in°ation.
Notice that suboptimality of the Nash equilibrium arises even if the monetary authority
is appropriately conservative in the sense that its monetary policy is consistent with the
second best;5 higher-than-optimal public spending raises output and in°ation, which makes
monetary policy more contractionary than under joint commitment.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) study monetary-¯scal interactions in a closed economy
when ¯scal policy consist of a production subsidy that generates deadweight losses. They
¯nd that the Nash equilibrium has output lower and prices higher than optimal and than
5Given the output goal yM;1 and the weight on it µM;1, the central bank is appropriately conservative (so





µM;ibi(~ y1;t ¡ yM;i): (56)
19what either authority wants. Hence, their Nash equilibrium is suboptimal and extreme, but
in a di®erent way than here. Their Nash equilibrium lies above and to the left of point C in
Figure 2, while the Nash equilibrium here lies below and to the right of point C. In Dixit and
Lambertini, time inconsistency makes ¯scal policy tighter than optimal so that production
subsidies are too low in the Nash equilibrium; since output is lower than optimal, monetary
policy is more expansionary than optimal, thereby raising prices above their optimal level.
Fiscal policy works di®erently here: time inconsistency makes ¯scal policy more expansionary
than optimal, thereby raising output and making monetary policy tighter than optimal. As
a result, the Nash equilibrium has higher output and lower in°ation than at the second best.
7 Concluding Comments
We would like to conclude with some implications of our results for the design of institutions
in a monetary union such as the EMU and suggestions for future research.
Central bank independence, given to the ECB by the Maastricht Treaty, implies that
di®erent authorities will choose monetary and ¯scal policies in a non-cooperative manner.
In this setting, making the central bank extra conservative (in the sense of low ideal output
and in°ation) is likely to make things worse. The non-cooperative interaction between the
central bank and the ¯scal authorities leads to a race between expansionary ¯scal policy
that aims to raise output and contractionary monetary policy that aims to reduce in°ation.
The resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by both in°ation and output that are more
extreme than the ideal levels of all authorities in the monetary union. More importantly,
the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal. This result occurs independently of ¯scal cooperation;
in fact, ¯scal cooperation may make things worse.
How to avoid such extreme outcomes? If the authorities' preferences can be chosen in
advance and can be made to coincide, the ideal goals for in°ation and output can be attained.
But if the policy preferences are ¯xed and in disagreement, then the outcomes can only be
in°uenced by how institutions are designed.
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Appendix
A Log Linearization around the Steady State
This section log linearizes around the steady state and solves for in°ation and output in each











t = ¹t ¡ pt + ¯Et^ it+1 (A.2)
where ^ it+1 ´ dit+1=i, where i = r because we focus on a steady state with constant money
supply, and ¹t is the deviation in money supply.
Log-linearizing the Euler equation (7) we ¯nd
Etc1;t+1 ¡ c1;t = (1 ¡ ¯)^ rt; (A.3)
21and log-linearizing the Fisher relationship we obtain









t + (1 ¡ ¯)(¹t ¡ pt) + ¯Et¼t+1: (A.5)






















We have two expressions for yw
t , (A.5) and (A.7); we can equalize them to obtain an expres-
sion for ww
t ¡ pt to substitute into (36) to ¯nd in°ation as a function of monetary and ¯scal
policies, the exogenous shocks and future in°ation. More precisely
¼t = mt +
2 X
i=1




Ã ´ ¸(1 + ´)(1 ¡ ¯); mt =
Ã
1 + Ã
¹t; c1 = n
¸´
1 + Ã





1 ¡ ¯ + Ã
1 + Ã









Output in country 1 can be found by y1;t = yw
t + (1 ¡ n)(y1;t ¡ y2;t), where




g1;t ¡ g2;t +
b1;t+1
1 ¡ n
+ c1 ¡ c2
#
; (A.9)
where c1 ¡ c2 is the di®erence in steady-state consumption changes
c1 ¡ c2 =
µ ¡ 1
µ(1 + ´) ¡ 1
"
(1 + ´)(a1 ¡ a2) +
rb1µ´
(1 ¡ n)(µ ¡ 1)
#
; (A.10)
where b1 is the change in country1's net asset position in the new steady state.
22B Social Welfare Function
We follow Woodford (2003) and consider a second-order Taylor series approximation to the
objective
Ut = u(Ct;²t) ¡
Z 1
0
v(Nt(i);²t)di + ®x(Gt;²t) (B.11)
with












The approximation is made around the steady-state level of output Y for each good and
the mean values for the exogenous shocks. Here we derive the welfare criterion that applies
to a limiting cashless economy and therefore we abstract from the welfare consequences of
monetary frictions.
We will proceed brie°y; for details, see Woodford (2003). Let ²t = (d;´;µ;At) denote the
complete vector of preference and technological shocks that we normalize so that E(²t) = 0
and let a ¹ denote steady-state value and, for simplicity, we drop time subscripts; a second-
order expansion of the ¯rst and last term on the right-hand side of (B.11) is given by






















tu²²²t + uG² ~ Gt²t
¸
;
where ~ Ct ´ Ct ¡ ¹ Ct and ~ Gt ´ Gt ¡ ¹ Gt. At the steady state, ¹ C = ¹ Y ¡ ¹ G. We assume that ~ G
is small enough, speci¯cally of order O(jj²jj2). After using Taylor expansion
Yt
¹ Y





where ^ Yt ´ log(Yt=¹ Y ) (and similarly for other variables) and neglecting terms that are of
order O(jj²jj3) or higher) order, we obtain




























where st is of order O(jj²jj). Taking the limit as ® ! 0, (B.12) simpli¯es to














































vY Y ¹ Y
;
where qt is of order O(jj²jj). Since vY Y ¹ Y =vY = ´, we have that
Z 1
0
v(Nt(i);²t)di = ¹ Y vY
·




2 + var^ Yt(i)) ¡ ´qtE ^ Yt(i)
¸
: (B.15)
Using the Taylor series approximation





















which is the monopolistic distortions that we assume to be of order O(jj²jj), we obtain
Z 1
0
v(Nt(i);²t)di = ¹ Y uC
(Ã
































































Notice that ¾ = 1 with u(C) = logC. The output terms above (together with a constant)
come from the term [^ Yt ¡ ^ Y n
t ¡ log(Y ¤
t =¹ Y )]2, where ^ Y n
t = log(Y n
t ¡ ¹ Y ), where Y n
t is the
equilibrium level of output at t under complete price °exibility. Let yt be gap between
current output and output under complete °exibility and let yF be the gap between steady-
















Áµ[µ(1 + ´) ¡ 1]
> 0; µF =
(1 + ´)(1 ¡ Á)
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24Social welfare is lower: a) the larger the gap between actual and the e±cient level of output;
b) the higher price dispersion that materializes with changes in the price level; c) the larger
public spending.
Finally, we brie°y discuss the case where ® > 0. In this case, government spending
is a public good that raises social welfare directly. A benevolent ¯scal authority chooses
government spending according to the ¯rst-order condition (15); steady-state output is
¹ Y =
"





As long as ® < µ=(µ ¡ 1), steady-state output is below e±ciency and there is an output




































but [^ Yt ¡ log(Y ¤




µ + constant term = ¡2 ®
1+´ ^ G if ® is small.
The period social loss function is as (B.17) with
± = +
®(1 ¡ Á)
Áµ[µ(1 + ´) ¡ 1]
> 0; gt ´ ^ Gt:
25